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71 
STEPHEN PRESSER’S LOVE LETTER TO 
THE LAW, IN FIVE PARTS 
LAW PROFESSORS: THREE CENTURIES OF 
SHAPING AMERICAN LAW. By Stephen B. Presser.1 St. 
Paul: West Publishing, 2017. Pp. xii + 486. $48.00 (cloth). 
Jesse Merriam2 
This book on law professors, Stephen Presser writes in the 
Preface, is a “love letter to the teaching of law” (p. v). But this is 
no mere “love letter.” The twenty-four chapters read more like a 
break-up letter, sounding with each successive chapter the 
ominous tone of a betrayed lover—more like Søren Kierkegaard’s 
regretful reflections on losing Regine Olsen to a more decisive 
suitor, and less like Kierkegaard’s earlier romantic confessions of 
adoration for Regine.3 Reading Law Professors, one gets the 
impression that, like Kierkegaard, Presser is writing his love letter 
with some bitterness, recalling the halcyon days of the legal 
academy when it was more insulated from the mass and welter of 
partisan politics. 
Like all love letters contemplating the future of the 
relationship, Law Professors is essentially about change and loss, 
 
 1. Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History Emeritus, Northwestern University 
School of Law. 
 2. Assistant Professor, Political Science, Loyola University Maryland. Ph.D. 
(Political Science, Johns Hopkins University); J.D. (The George Washington University 
School of Law); M.A. (Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University); B.A. (Wesleyan 
University). 
 3. For Kierkegaard’s letters to Regine, see SØREN KIERKEGAARD, PAPERS AND 
JOURNALS: A SELECTION (Alastair Hannay ed., 1996). For an excellent review of a recent 
Danish book specifically on the relationship between Kierkegaard and Olsen, see Morten 
Høi Jensen, A Keeper of Love’s Flame: Regine Olsen and Søren Kierkegaard, L.A. REV. 
BOOKS (Apr. 9, 2014), http://lareviewofbooks.org/article/keeper-loves-flame-regine-
olsen-soren-kierkegaard. This is a review OF JOAKIM GARFF, REGINES GÅDE: HISTORIEN 
OM KIERKEGAARDS FORLOVEDE OG SCHLEGELS HUSTRU (2013), which translates to 
“Regine’s Mystery: The Story of Kierkegaard’s Fiancée and Schlegel’s Wife.” Garff’s book 
sounds fascinating, and I would also recommend it in addition to Jensen’s excellent review, 
but, alas, I do not read Danish. 
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making it ideal for a course on social movements and legal 
change.4 These themes are all the more serious, given Presser’s 
prominent academic status, holding joint appointments at 
Northwestern University5 and having authored several 
casebooks—ranging from corporate law, to legal history, to 
constitutional law and theory—as well as two important, and 
controversial, books arguing for a reconsideration of various 
areas of constitutional law.6 Presser’s recent move to emeritus 
status gives this tome on law professors an even heavier tone, the 
ruminations of a legal giant on his thirty-plus years of experience 
in the legal academy. 
While Law Professors is a ruminative book, it is also a 
thoroughly fun and playful one. Presser, in critiquing the prolixity 
and opacity of legal scholarship, quotes Ronald Rotunda’s 
observation that “[r]eading about law is not often fun” (p. 7 n.13), 
a proposition with which this reviewer generally agrees. But there 
are exceptions, times when reading law can be as enjoyable as 
reading literature. And Professor Presser has provided such an 
exception in this book. Indeed, even knowledgeable readers will 
find in Law Professors trivia certain to titillate and amuse. Sure, 
you already knew about Posner’s contributions to the law and 
economics movement, but did you know about Fang, his 
Norwegian elkhound (p. 308)? Or that James Wilson was the 
nation’s third law professor (p. 32 n.77)? Presser even divulges 
some information about himself, such as that he is a Dr. Seuss fan, 
something that might surprise some followers of Presser’s 
academic writing over the years (p. 137 n.445). Nearly every one 
of the 473 highly digestible pages, including the 1,384 unbroken 
sequential footnotes, bubbles with factoids that historically 
oriented, and indeed all intellectually curious, readers will enjoy. 
The trivia keeps the book light, but the sense of change, and 
the resulting loss, creates an acute sense of betrayal, with three 
ominous themes reappearing throughout the work. One is the 
 
 4. For example, I am considering using it for my seminar on the legal conservative 
movement. 
 5. Presser holds appointments at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, the 
Kellogg School of Management, and the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences, 
Department of History. 
 6. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION: RACE, 
RELIGION, AND ABORTION RECONSIDERED (1994); STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE 
ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS AND THE DIALECTIC 
OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE (1991). 
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evolving conception of law over the last 200 years. At various 
points in the book, Presser emphasizes how law professors have 
moved away from a natural theory of law (wherein legal norms 
inhere in the divine order of the world, thus creating a necessary 
relationship between law and morality) and toward a more 
positivistic understanding (wherein legal norms are ultimately 
traceable to positive political action, thereby severing the 
necessary connection between law and morality). Presser, 
through his careful chronicling of the American legal academy, 
documents how Oliver Wendell Holmes represented a dramatic 
departure from the natural law tradition, and indeed the entire 
American legal tradition. Strikingly, all of the pre-Holmes 
professors featured in the book make natural law a central feature 
of their understanding of law, and almost all of the post-Holmes 
professors reject this approach in favor of a more positivist, 
empirical, and court-oriented understanding. Nearly everyone 
reading this book will already be aware of this transition away 
from legal naturalism and formalism and toward positivism and 
realism, but even to the informed reader, it is startling to see in 
Presser’s chronology how abruptly and comprehensively 
conceptions of law have changed within the legal academy. 
A related theme intimated throughout the book is the 
increasing politicization of the legal academy, especially toward 
the left end of the ideological spectrum. Presser often alludes to 
how many of the 18th and 19th century scholars featured in the 
book did not make politics a central feature of their scholarship, 
in stark contrast with 20th and 21st century legal scholars. Indeed, 
the 21st century law professor is no longer expected simply to 
have the expertise to analyze and teach law, but to be especially 
well equipped to make law, too. This is vividly illustrated in 
Presser’s chronology, with many of the post-Holmes scholars 
having worked in the executive branch, almost always to push 
legal reform for the advancement of a progressive agenda. This 
trend is represented most strikingly in Chapter 23, profiling 
President Barack Obama, the apotheosis of the progressive 
politician-professor. 
The 2016 election put this new law professor identity on full 
display. Following President Donald Trump’s victory, one 
thousand four hundred twenty-four law professors took the 
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unprecedented step7 of joining a public statement condemning 
Trump’s nomination of Jeff Sessions for attorney general.8 Just a 
few months before that, in the month leading up to the election, 
many right-of-center law professors joined a statement, 
Originalists Against Trump, opposing the Republican nominee.9 
At the same time, some significant progressive law professors 
publicly called for secession, and even a military coup, in the event 
of a Trump victory.10 And in February 2017, yet another law 
professor statement was circulated, this one condemning Trump 
for calling U.S. District Court Judge James L. Robart a “so-called 
judge,” in light of Judge Robart’s decision to enjoin Trump’s first 
travel ban Executive Order.11 
Such recent public gestures from the legal academy make 
Presser’s book particularly timely and provocative. Presser asks 
throughout the book: What gives law professors the authority to 
evaluate public policy? More troubling, he probes, what gives law 
professors the skill to engage in policy, a question suggested by 
former CIA Director, Leon Panetta, in his criticism of President 
Obama’s tendency to “rel[y] on the logic of a law professor rather 
than the passion of a leader” (p. 1). This issue, of what skills a law 
professor can bring to governance, and the related transition in 
the identity of the law professor, from natural lawyer to policy 
maker, are central to Presser’s love letter. 
A third theme, hinted at but not as expressly stated as the 
previous two, is the changing meaning of legal ideology over space 
 
 7. The only other instance in which law professors have been so outspoken on a 
presidential election was, perhaps not coincidentally, in response to the 2000 victory of the 
last Republican President, George W. Bush. Within days of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), over 600 law school professors wrote a public letter 
condemning the decision as violating their commitments “as teachers whose lives have 
been dedicated to the rule of law.” See Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of Law Survive 
Bush v. Gore?, in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 110, 113 (Bruce 
Ackerman ed., 2002). 
 8.  Law Professors in Opposition to Jeff Sessions Nomination (Jan. 9, 2017), 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/167Ci3pVqwzOUe7_e7itlpew1qGcTo0ZD5dNICIb
LQWA/pub. 
 9. 2016 Statement, Originalists Against Trump (Oct. 17, 2016), 
https://originalistsagainsttrump.wordpress.com/2016-statement. 
 10.  Jacob Gershman, Law Professors Grapple with Trump, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 2, 2016, 2:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/11/02/law-professors-grapple-with-
trump/?ref=/blogs/law. 
 11. Letter from Attorneys Concerning President Trump’s Attack on the Judiciary 
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1JVcPW_mYa5jw6nm_R7XS21l5igpm
BzfBONBFMmrOALs/viewform?c=0&w=1&edit_requested=true#responses. 
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and time. For example, Presser argues that Justice Story was “a 
great Burkean, and a great conservative” (p. 60), despite the fact 
that Story favored a robust and expansive judicial power, which 
of course is at odds with how many contemporary conservatives 
view the role of federal judges. For Presser—who is “nothing if 
not a traditionalist” (p. ix), what is often referred to in 
conservative thought as “a paleoconservative”12—the traditional 
meaning of legal conservatism favors “a moral, altruistic Burkean 
legal aristocracy” (p. 60), one in which courts are actively engaged 
in preserving the nation’s social mores and traditions for the 
stability and moral health of society. This is a view increasingly at 
odds with both the contemporary legal left (which generally 
favors judicial transformation of these values to promote greater 
equality) and legal right (which generally favors judicial 
disengagement from these values to promote democratic 
governance and decentralization).13 
As Mark Pulliam, a prolific conservative legal writer, 
explained in a recent review of Law Professors, “Presser may be 
the most conservative law professor in America associated with a 
major law school.”14 Although I am not quite as comfortable 
ideologically ranking professors, as that begs the question of what 
it means to be more or less conservative (a question on which 
many reasonable minds can and will disagree, especially as 
applied to legal issues), it is undoubtedly true that Presser is one 
 
 12. Paleoconservatives (“paleocons”) generally are defined in contradistinction to a 
new (and decidedly more liberal) form of conservatism that emerged in the 1970s, a group 
now known as neoconservatives (“neocons”). Paleocons and neocons generally divide 
most sharply with regard to their ideological preferences on three issues: (1) the size of the 
federal government (neocons are much more accommodating of the welfare state), (2) the 
use of American military force abroad (neocons are much more likely to support 
interventionist policies), and (3) the role of egalitarian perspectives in conservatism 
(neocons view egalitarianism as central to, rather than antithetical to, conservatism). See 
Paul Gottfried, Paleoconservativism, in AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
651 (Bruce Frohnen et al. eds., 2006). 
 13. But it should be noted that, among right-of-center law professors, there is an 
increasing push for more judicial engagement and less judicial restraint. This comes almost 
exclusively, however, from the libertarian strand, rather than the more traditionalist 
strand, of legal conservatism. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN 
CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016); 
Randy E. Barnett, Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical, 19 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 845 (2012); SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE 
ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606–1787 (2011). 
 14.  Mark Pulliam, American Legal Thought in a Nutshell, LAW & 
LIBERTY (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2017/03/16/american-legal-
thought-in-a-nutshell. 
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of the few remaining paleoconservatives left in legal academia.15 
With Presser’s exit from the academy, this traditional version of 
conservatism has virtually no voice in legal scholarship, or in legal 
discourse altogether, giving a particularly poignant and literal 
meaning to the “paleo” prefix. 
In the following pages, I will analyze how the book raises 
these three themes: the changing conceptions of law, the changing 
identities of law professors, and the changing meaning of legal 
ideology. I will do this by dividing the review into five parts, based 
on my placing the twenty-four chapters into five distinct 
categories. Chapters 1 through 4 constitute the romance of the 
love letter, what I have characterized as Falling in Love, the 
period when, to use Kierkegaard’s words from one of his love 
letters, “a man sees the beloved object for the first time . . . [and] 
believes he has seen her long before.”16 This period—which 
Presser explores through such diverse thinkers as Blackstone, 
Wilson, Story, and Langdell—is characterized by legal naturalism, 
when law was imbricated in and tethered to nature. Chapters 5 
through 8 cover the Villain, legal realism, which can be 
characterized as a period when law was denaturalized and thereby 
seduced away from Presser. The third period, Reconciliation, 
covers the effort to bring the law back home, through a middle-
ground, process-oriented approach to law, explored most directly 
in Chapters 9 and 11. The fourth period, A Second Infidelity, 
covers another round of villains, the critical legal scholars, more 
radical but perhaps more interesting than the realists, explored in 
 
 15. This, incidentally, is at least partly responsible for why Presser felt “lonely being 
a Donald Trump supporter in the legal academy,” a position that, as Presser noted, “not 
more than a handful of” law professors were willing to take openly. Stephen Presser, What 
American Law Professors Forgot and What Trump Knew, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 17, 2016), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-law-professors-trump-
scalia-supreme-court-conservative-perspec-1118-md-20161117-story.html. In typical Press
erian accuracy, he is not exaggerating or being metaphorical with the term “handful.” 
Besides Presser, exactly five law professors in the country were willing to support the 
Republican nominee openly: F.H. Buckley, John C. Eastman, Bruce Frohnen, Lino 
Graglia, and Ronald Rotunda. See Chris Buskirk, Scholars and Writers for Trump, 
AMERICAN GREATNESS (Sept. 28, 2016), http://amgreatness.com/2016/09/28/writes-
scholars-for-trump. Many of the right-of-center law professors in the nation publicly 
opposed Trump. See supra note 9. It should be noted that Trump received significant 
support from paleoconservatives, such as Presser, not because Trump represents a 
traditional mode of life (he most certainly does not, as a flamboyant, secular, thrice-
married, real-estate mogul), but because he supports the three policy platforms that 
paleoconservatives tend to care about most: (1) military isolationism, (2) trade 
protectionism, and (3) immigration restrictionism. See supra note 12. 
 16. See KIERKEGAARD, supra note 3, at 100. 
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Chapters 14 through 17. Finally, the fifth period, A Rocky Future, 
looks ahead, examining the response to this second infidelity 
through various figures in the legal conservative movement 
(Chapters 18 through 20) and the triumph over legal conservatism 
in the Obama presidency (Chapters 22 and 23). 
Two caveats before we begin, one about the book and the 
other about the following review. One, in reading Law Professors, 
the attentive reader will undoubtedly find reason to quibble over 
Presser’s choices concerning the profiled scholars, an unavoidable 
product of his effort to capture the history of the American legal 
academy through a select set of figures. One may reasonably 
question, for example, why Presser includes one English law 
professor (Blackstone), one fictional one (Lewis Eliot), and one 
fictional American law professor (Kingsfield)—not to mention 
one president who was never a tenure-track law professor (but 
rather a lecturer who never published anything on law other than 
a six-page student note)17 and several Supreme Court Justices who 
spent only a few years in the academy. As a result, Presser devotes 
a lot of space in Law Professors to the ideas and experiences of 
people who are not American law professors, which may be a bit 
startling given the book’s title and theme. This comes at the cost 
of excluding many law professors who would have added to the 
narrative. For example, would Breyer, the pragmatist and “active 
liberty” proponent, satisfy Presser’s call for law professors, and in 
turn judges, to be more grounded in and attentive to practical 
realities? Does Bork fit Presser’s call for a more majoritarian 
sense of tradition in the academy? How would a discussion of 
Barnett’s natural-law libertarianism complicate Presser’s 
suppositions about the relationship between natural law and 
conservatism? These are questions obscured by Presser’s decision 
to focus on select professors rather than general concepts in 
seeking to capture the ideological transformation of the legal 
academy over the last 200 years. 
Two, this review will focus to a significant extent on what 
Law Professors can teach us about the role of ideology in legal 
discourse, which may suggest to the reader of this review that Law 
Professors is a polemical tract. I want to be clear on this point: 
Law Professors most certainly is not partisan or tendentious, in 
 
 17.  Jeffrey Ressner & Ben Smith, Exclusive: Obama’s Lost Law Review Article, 
POLITICO (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.politico.com/story/2008/08/exclusive-obamas-lost-
law-review-article-012705. 
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any conceivable way. Rather, Law Professors is thoroughly kind 
and temperate in tone, and equitable and balanced in analysis. 
Nevertheless, in the course of the 473 pages, there are several 
places where Presser does reveal his thinking on various matters 
and scholars, more often through implication than explication. 
This has the salutary effect of permitting, on the one hand, readers 
uninterested in Presser’s political and legal philosophy to gather 
a broad array of information about the legal academy without the 
sense of being harangued, while offering, on the other hand, 
sufficient insight into Presser’s traditionalist perspective for more 
ideologically oriented readers. In the review, I will be focusing on 
this ideological dimension of the book—partly because of my own 
background as a legal theorist who studies social movements in 
the law, but also because a mere recitation of the profiled scholars 
would be unduly duplicative of Presser’s book. 
In sum, although some readers will surely quibble over 
Presser’s inclusions and exclusions, and some will find insufficient 
or perhaps too much ideology in Law Professors,18 the book works 
remarkably well in capturing: (1) how law professors think about 
law, (2) how this thinking continues to evolve, perhaps at an 
accelerated rate over the last fifty years, and (3) how these recent 
changes are arousing concern that the rule of law is in serious 
trouble. Law Professors is best read not by fixating on the actual 
persons profiled, which will inevitably lead the reader to cavil 
over some of the choices, but by focusing on the big ideas, with a 
particular attention on how those ideas have migrated and 
morphed across space and time. 
With these caveats in mind, let us begin with when Presser 
“sees the beloved object for the first time.”19 
 
 18. For example, Mark Pulliam’s only criticism of the book is that it is an 
overwhelmingly “dispassionate overview of American legal thought,” and Pulliam would 
prefer for Presser to provide a “comprehensive critique of it.” Pulliam, supra note 14.  
Conversely, Dean Chemerinsky’s principal criticism is that Presser’s writing is too 
ideological, “especially as to the more contemporary portrayals.” Erwin Chemerinsky, A 
Conservative’s View of Law Professors, Cal. Sup. Ct. Hist. Soc’y Newsl., Spring/Summer 
2017, at 29, https://www.cschs.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/2017-Newsletter-Spring-
Conservatives-View.pdf. Moreover, Chemerinsky finds it “disconcerting . . . that [Presser] 
asserts his [conservative] views as self-evident conclusions” and “disquieting that virtually 
all of th[e] profiled [professors] are white men.” Id. at 30. 
 19. See KIERKEGAARD, supra note 3, at 100. 
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I. FALLING IN LOVE 
If Law Professors is Presser’s love letter to the law, the first 
three chapters—dedicated to Sir William Blackstone, James 
Wilson, and Joseph Story—form the romance of the story, 
outlining why and how Presser fell in love with the subject. In each 
of these thinkers, Presser finds a religious commitment to the 
foundation of law and an aristocratic commitment to social 
hierarchy, cultural tradition, and moral order—a view holding 
that there is no order without law, no law without morality, and 
no morality without religion. A well-ordered society, therefore, 
requires religion, and the healthy state must facilitate rather than 
subordinate that relationship. 
In defending Blackstone, Wilson, and Story against their 
familiar opponents, Presser provides provocative and interesting 
connections that even the historically oriented reader might not 
have considered. In Chapter 1, for example, Presser defends 
Blackstone from the criticisms of Bentham, who waged a life-long 
attack on his former teacher for mystifying and deifying the 
common law.20 Presser is generally dismissive of Bentham, 
characterizing his criticism of Blackstone as shallow and personal, 
but Presser is more eager to reconcile Blackstone and Thomas 
Jefferson, who lambasted Blackstone for being a conservative 
Tory. Here, Presser points out that Jefferson’s own legal 
philosophy, which of course was characteristic of the 
Enlightenment view of law, was strikingly similar to that of 
Blackstone, in that while Jefferson resisted explicitly linking law 
with a Christian conception of God,21 Jefferson was just as eager 
as Blackstone to ground law in the edicts of nature. This is 
expressed most famously in the Declaration of Independence, 
which Presser draws our attention to, given its close relationship 
 
 20. In 1763, when only fifteen years old, Bentham began attending Blackstone’s 
Oxford lectures (the lectures from which Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England later emerged). A little more than a decade later, Bentham provided his first 
formal critique of Blackstone’s Commentaries. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON 
GOVERNMENT (Ross Harrison ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1776). At the age 
of 80, more than 50 years after publishing that criticism, Bentham wrote a more sustained 
criticism of Blackstone in his A Familiar View of Blackstone, a work that he was editing 
until his death, four years later. See J. H. Burns, Bentham and Blackstone: A Lifetime’s 
Dialectic, 1 UTILITAS 22 (1989). 
 21. It should be noted that Jefferson, though skeptical of Jesus’s divinity, clearly 
recognized his great philosophical and moral authority. See generally THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
JEFFERSON’S EXTRACTS FROM THE GOSPELS (Dickson W. Adams et al, eds. 1983). 
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to Blackstone’s thinking in the Commentaries that law is “the plan 
of the Creator for the happiness of mankind” (p. 20 n.48).22 
Similarly, in Chapter 2, on James Wilson (who was a law 
professor at what became the University of Pennsylvania while he 
served as one of the six original Supreme Court Justices), Presser 
writes how, just like Blackstone and Jefferson, Wilson viewed 
“liberty and life” as the “gifts of heaven” (p. 34 n.86). Indeed, 
Presser contends, Wilson may have inspired Jefferson’s thinking 
in the Declaration of Independence (p. 34). And Wilson, rather 
than Madison, may be justly characterized as the principal author 
of the Constitution (p. 35), given that he spoke more at the 
Convention than did Madison (p. 35), many of Madison’s specific 
proposals at the Convention were rejected (p. 35 n.96), and the 
initial drafts of the Constitution were apparently in Wilson’s 
handwriting (p. 35). For Presser, Wilson is the American 
Blackstone, not only in his intellectual influence in shaping the 
American legal system, but also in his approach to law, which 
Presser characterizes as “conservative” (p. 38), due largely to 
Wilson’s prioritizing common over statutory law in embodying 
the commands of nature. 
But Wilson is the American version, meaning that he 
democratized Blackstone’s understanding of sovereignty, 
transplanting it from the English monarchical system to the 
emerging American notion of a republican democracy. As Presser 
writes, quoting Knapp, “James Wilson literally invented the 
American people as a unitary sovereign entity” (p. 39 n.115). But 
this did not mean for Wilson that the law has the power to 
 
 22. Presser also could have mentioned more broadly that God appears throughout 
Jefferson’s thinking on individual liberty and moral order. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Bill 
for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), https://founders.archives.gov
/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0082(defending religious liberty on the ground 
“that Almighty God hath created the mind free” as the “Holy Author of our religion”); 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, QUERY XVII (1784), 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/jefferson/ch17.html (proclaiming that although there is a 
right “to say there are twenty gods, or no god,” because “[i]t neither picks my pockets nor 
breaks my leg,” an atheist may justly be prohibited from testifying in court and be socially 
stigmatized if he “cannot be relied on”); THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
VIRGINIA, QUERY XVIII (1784), http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/jefferson/ch18.html 
(questioning whether “the liberties of a nation [can] be thought secure when we have 
removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties 
are of the gift of God”). See also EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, SWORN ON THE ALTAR OF GOD: A 
RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 135 (1996) (explaining why for Jefferson 
“[t]he connection [between religion and morality] seemed so close as to make the two 
virtually identical”).	
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constrain merely because a majority of the sovereign consents. 
Instead of adhering to this simple majoritarianism, Wilson held 
that the validity of law also turns on its compliance with “the 
science of human nature,” an inquiry guided by traditions and 
customs—what Wilson dubbed “manners”—creating a link not 
only between the American and British experience, but a link that 
is traceable all the way back to the ancient Greeks and Romans 
(p. 42). 
In the next chapter, Presser profiles another law professor-
Supreme Court Justice, Joseph Story, who furthered Wilson’s 
project of synthesizing natural law with American republican 
democracy in the realm of constitutional law. Here, Presser 
introduces the first case discussed in the book, Swift v. Tyson,23 a 
Justice Story opinion holding that federal courts must apply 
federal common law when exercising diversity jurisdiction. The 
Swift decision, which was based on the idea that federal judges 
have a unique insight into the commands of natural law, was 
overruled almost one hundred years later, in Erie Railroad 
Company v. Tompkins,24 a decision that almost ineluctably 
followed once legal realism had overtaken the academy and 
judiciary, bringing with it a distrust of any effort to interpret law 
according to nature. Presser defends Swift, just as he defends 
Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution, as being essential to 
setting up a national system of government – not only for the 
mercantile purpose of facilitating commerce but for the broader 
purpose of constructing a unified American cultural identity. 
Presser thus argues that Story was “deeply conservative, and 
deeply influenced by English thinkers such as Blackstone and 
Edmund Burke” (p. 52). Here, Presser views Story’s national 
constitutionalism as consonant with President Lincoln’s and 
Senator Sumner’s commitment to a “perpetual union,” but 
apparently at odds with thinkers we might characterize as 
Southern conservatives – thinkers like Jefferson, Calhoun, and 
Randolph, who emphasized the importance of agrarian and local 
communities in conserving tradition. In contrast to these 
Southern localists, Story’s national constitutionalism, Presser 
concludes, put Story in the company of “a nobler vision of 
conservatism, one that is not wholly absent in the work of other 
 
 23. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
 24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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‘Republican’ [in both the old and new sense of the term] Justices, 
such as Samuel Chase, Richard Peters,25 Rufus Peckham, and 
more recently William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence 
Thomas” (p. 60). Presser does not make entirely clear, however, 
what makes this Northern, more mercantile, national 
constitutionalism a “nobler” form of legal conservatism than its 
Southern, more agrarian, localist counterpart.  Nor does Presser 
clarify what exactly makes Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas similar 
to these 18th and 19th century judges.  
A critical figure in Presser’s chronology of how the 
conception of law in the academy has changed, away from the 
natural and toward the positive, is Christopher Columbus 
Langdell, the first Dean of Harvard Law School and the architect 
of the case method. Although Presser provides a measured 
defense of Langdell’s efforts to systematize and professionalize 
legal education, Presser seems to agree with the prevailing view 
in the legal academy that Langdell misunderstood the nature of 
law in seeking to model legal studies after the natural sciences. 
Presser hints that the real fault in Langdell’s approach, however, 
is not its formalism, as the conventional critique generally holds, 
but its scientism – namely, that Langdell’s “law as science” 
approach cleared the way for the study of law to become the 
empirical study of judicial behavior, a transition completed by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, for whom Presser arguably shows the 
most hostility in what is otherwise a thoroughly even-tempered 
book. Indeed, every romance novel must have a villain, 
threatening to seduce away the protagonist’s love, just as Johan 
Frederik Schlegel did to Kierkegaard’s Regine. And if Presser is 
our hero, Holmes is our villain. 
II. THE VILLAIN 
Presser’s primary grievance against Holmes is that he was not 
simply skeptical about the extent to which legal norms can 
constrain judicial decision-making, as was the case for all of the 
realists, but he was also terribly cynical about human nature. 
Many biographical accounts of Holmes have attributed his 
 
 25. There seems to be a typographical error in referring to Judge Peters as a Supreme 
Court Justice (p. 60). In 1792, President Washington appointed Peters to the United States 
District Court for the District of Pennsylvania, a position he occupied until his death in 
1828. 
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cynicism to the Civil War, in which he fought valiantly after 
having enlisted while still a Senior at Harvard College. He was 
badly wounded in battle and some scholars have speculated that 
witnessing the despair and horror of a bloody ideological battle 
left him without a strong moral compass for the remaining 70 
years of his life.26 Indeed, his violent first-hand experience with 
what he would later call “fighting faiths”27 seems to have 
transformed his youthful idealism, which bore some of the 
transcendentalism of Emerson,28 into a more detached moral 
pragmatism, which often times approached a Nietzschean 
nihilism.29 
Throughout Law Professors, Presser is overwhelmingly kind 
and respectful in his treatment of the profiled scholars, even those 
whom Presser criticizes, but, as mentioned above, he is perhaps 
the harshest on Holmes, in ways that may not be entirely 
defensible. Not only does Presser neglect important biographical 
details (such as some of the information above about Holmes’s 
involvement in and views on the Civil War) that may give the 
reader a more sympathetic understanding of his callousness,30 but 
Presser may be guilty also of overstating Holmes’s agency in 
denaturalizing law. 
 
 26. This horror is heart-breakingly captured on the back of an envelope of a letter a 
young Holmes wrote to his parents: “Write as often as poss. It is still kill–kill–all the time.” 
TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 
JR. 1861-1864 137 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 2000). Many years later, Holmes would write 
to Learned Hand that he did not have any children, because “this is not the kind of world 
I want to bring anyone else into.” G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 106 (1993). The memory of the Civil War seemed to 
haunt Holmes throughout his life, leading him, in 1932, when he retired from the bench at 
the age of 90, to cry while reading to Felix Frankfurter’s wife, Marion Frankfurter, a poem 
about the Civil War. As Holmes is reported to have told Lewis Einstein, “after the Civil 
War the world never seemed quite right again.” Lewis Einstein, Introduction, in THE 
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS 
EINSTEIN, at xvi (James Bishop Peabody ed., 1964). 
 27. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 28. On Emerson’s influence on Holmes, see ALLEN MENDENHALL, OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES JR., PRAGMATISM, AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AGON: AESTHETIC 
DISSENT AND THE COMMON LAW (2016). 
 29. On this connection between Holmes and Nietzsche, see Allen Mendenhall and 
Seth Vannatta, The American Nietzsche? Fate and Power in the Philosophy of O.W. 
Holmes, Jr., 85 UMKC L. REV. 187 (2016). 
 30. Presser does mention in passing Holmes’s involvement in the Civil War as an 
explanation for some of his “unsavory qualit[ies],” but he does not explore this explanation 
in any detail (p. 86). This is particularly surprising, given the detail and attention Presser 
gives to the other profiled scholars, bringing them to life in a way that inevitably 
complicates any criticism of their ideas. 
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On this latter point, that of Holmes’s agency, three issues are 
worth addressing here. One, as Brian Tamanaha has argued, in his 
excellent book Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide, many of 
Holmes’s contemporaries argued that he had essentially created a 
strawman in critiquing Langdell,31 because few practitioners had 
ever held such a strictly logical view of law, and even the 
purportedly formalist academics, like Langdell, were much more 
practically oriented and anchored to the ground than the realists 
later suggested they were. Two, Holmes, while mocking formalists 
for their logical rigidity, also took great pride in being constrained 
by law, famously professing, for example, that “[i]t has given me 
great pleasure to sustain the Constitutionality of laws that I 
believe to be as bad as possible, because I thereby helped to mark 
the difference between what I would forbid and what the 
Constitution permits.”32 Three, given the relatively thin line 
between formalism and realism that existed in the real world, the 
complaints coming from the so-called realists could be understood 
as more political than theoretical in both content and purpose. 
That is, the realists were not as concerned with the interpretive 
methodology the so-called “formalists” employed, as they were 
with the fact that many of these formalists were political 
conservatives resisting the economic and cultural transformation 
wrought by rapid industrialization, bureaucratic centralization, 
and unprecedented levels of immigration. In other words, the 
realists, to advance their political agenda, used the logical 
nomenclature of formalism to signify that their opponents were 
driven by a mechanical simplicity that was out of a step with 
changing times. Understood in this light, cases like Lochner v. 
New York33 were not bad because they were actually formalist 
decisions; rather, they were bad, in the realists’ view, because they 
were based on bad economic policy.34 
 
 31. For a discussion of many of these contemporaneous criticisms of Holmes, see 
BRIAN Z, TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING 27–43 (2009). As an example of one of these contemporaneous 
criticisms, see, Jabez Fox, Law and Logic, 14 HARV. L. REV. 39, 42 (1900). 
 32. NORMAN DORSEN, THE EMBATTLED CONSTITUTION 58 (2013). Many have 
pointed to this quote as an example of Holmes’s cruelty, in that he took pride in following 
the law even when it would undermine his notion of social justice. But this quote also 
weakens the idea that Holmes was a robust realist, eager to bend his understanding of the 
law to his will. 
 33. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 34. Indeed, Lochner, which is often excoriated for invaliding labor laws based on a 
formalist theory about the “freedom of contract,” was in fact much less formalist than, say, 
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This suggests that Presser’s villain is not really Holmes but a 
time period, the ethos that came to pervade American law and 
politics in the early 20th century. To be sure, Holmes was 
eventually used to further this progressive agenda, but his actual 
ideas about law may have had little agency in creating that 
movement. As is often the case with the villain in a love story, the 
problem was in the relationship itself, as much as we might want 
to blame the villain for adulterating our vision of that relationship. 
To push this analogy further, there was already something wrong 
with late-19th century American law, from Presser’s point of view, 
before Holmes, and there would have been something deeply 
wrong in 21st century American law even without Holmes. 
Presser’s analysis therefore would have benefitted from a 
discussion of the surrounding changes in American public life—
such as secularization and centralization—that almost certainly 
contributed more than Holmes to what Presser sees as the 
adulteration of American law. By ignoring these practical 
circumstances, and focusing instead only on the legal ideas 
themselves, Presser may be justly charged with committing the 
central vice that he condemns in his book—that of thinking too 
much like a law professor, in legal abstractions, detached from 
practical realities. 
Presser’s next few chapters are dedicated to other prominent 
legal realists—Wigmore, Pound, and Llewellyn. In these chapters, 
Presser emphasizes how they did not actually go quite as far as 
Holmes in repudiating legal traditionalism. Indeed, Presser notes, 
even Llewellyn, whose Bramble Bush is famous for its robust 
realism, did not accommodate himself to legal inconsistency in the 
way that Holmes had, despite defining law, similar to how Holmes 
had in The Path of the Law, as “[w]hat [legal] officials do about 
disputes” (p. 138). 
These chapters are consistent with the points made above—
i.e., that many of the so-called realists were not nearly as devoted 
to uprooting conventional legal conceptions as some later 
theorists would have us believe. These chapters are also important 
 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which derived a rigid trimester formula from an abstract 
concept of privacy, or Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), which derived a highly 
complicated three-pronged test based on a theory of what it means to establish religion. 
Roe and Lemon are generally embraced by 21st century progressives, not because they are 
more anchored to practical realities, but simply because these decisions are generally 
viewed as having salutary outcomes of promoting gender equality and secularism. 
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reminders that the early realists were not principally concerned 
with constitutional law and theory. Wigmore of course was an 
expert in evidence law, Pound in tort law, and Llewellyn in 
contract law. While some early realists, such as Judge Jerome 
Frank, can certainly be charged with seeking to overhaul our legal 
system altogether, the majority of the realists during this period, 
including Wigmore, Pound, and Llewellyn, had more modest 
ambitions, seeking rather to refine and reform their particular 
areas of study. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the individual agendas of 
Wigmore, Pound, and Llewellyn may have been relatively 
modest, and changing social and economic circumstances may 
have been more responsible than any of their respective ideas for 
what Presser perceives to be the adulteration of American law, all 
of these realists, along with Holmes, undoubtedly contributed to 
the notion that judges do, and should, exercise significant 
discretion in interpreting legal norms. And once this 
understanding of law became settled within the academy, the 
politicization of the judiciary verged on the inevitable, illustrated 
nicely in how the preponderance of the second half of Presser’s 
book is dedicated to legal scholars devoted in one way or another 
to justifying the Warren Court agenda. 
Two transitional figures along this path are Felix Frankfurter 
(profiled in Chapter 9) and Herbert Wechsler (profiled in 
Chapter 11).35 Frankfurter and Wechsler are fascinating figures, 
made all the more intriguing by their placement in Presser’s book, 
nearly half-way through the twenty-four chapters. After having 
read the entire book, the reader may leave with the impression 
that these two figures, and these two chapters, represent the true 
middle-point in Presser’s narrative, in that both Frankfurter and 
Wechsler straddled legal formalism and realism, adhering to a 
Holmesian model of judicial restraint even after it had outlived its 
original purpose of permitting greater economic regulation. 
Frankfurter and Wechsler are, moreover, the first two Jewish 
scholars featured in the book, and they, ironically, stirred up 
controversy for their perceived insensitivity on constitutional 
issues relating to cultural pluralism. In Presser’s romance with the 
law, we can think of these two thinkers as representing a 
 
 35. C. P. Snow’s fictional Lewis Eliot is sandwiched in between Frankfurter and 
Wechsler (in Chapter 10). 
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reconciliation of sorts, not quite fulfilling the promise of the 
honeymoon period, but cutting back on some of the excesses 
wrought by the realists. 
III. RECONCILIATION 
The chapter on Frankfurter highlights how he contributed to 
the emerging political identity of the law professor. Indeed, as a 
Harvard Law School professor, before his 1939 appointment to the 
Supreme Court, Frankfurter had an active political agenda, even 
serving as a personal adviser to FDR. In stark contrast with this 
activist agenda as a professor, however, Frankfurter had a 
restrained constitutional vision as a Supreme Court Justice, 
holding that separation-of-power and rule-of-law principles 
severely circumscribe the power of judicial review, particularly in 
cases involving coordinate branches of the federal government. 
Frankfurter, unlike Holmes, was doctrinaire in applying this 
theory, because Frankfurter saw judicial restraint as a 
constitutional command, unchanging with time—not as a practical 
expedient, as the pragmatic Holmes viewed it. This led 
Frankfurter to take increasingly conservative positions over the 
years, as progressive scholars and judges, having established that 
economic legislation would not be subject to exacting scrutiny, 
began to push for closer judicial review of social legislation, 
particularly when such legislation had a deleterious impact on 
“discrete and insular minorities.”36 
In covering Frankfurter’s transition, from New Deal virtuoso 
to Warren Court pariah, Presser focuses on Frankfurter’s Barnette 
dissent,37 which is of course famous for its highly vitriolic, 
passionate, and personal language.38 After that point, in which the 
Court made the abrupt decision of overruling itself only three 
years after Minersville School District v. Gobitis,39 Frankfurter’s 
conservatism seemed to harden, though perhaps Presser is too 
hard on Frankfurter in alleging that “Frankfurter did not have the 
sympathy for racial and ethnic minorities which generally 
characterized the Warren Court” (p. 174). This might be an 
 
 36. U.S. v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 37. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 38. He began the dissent by declaring that, as a Jew, he “belong[ed] to the most 
vilified and persecuted minority in history.” Id. 
 39. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
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overstatement, given that Frankfurter consistently demonstrated 
a strong compassion for the plight of African Americans,40 but it 
is certainly true that Frankfurter wrote his Barnette dissent with 
an extreme insensitivity toward religious minorities, exhorting 
them to assimilate into the dominant American Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant culture just as he had. Generally, however, it’s not so 
much that Frankfurter was unsympathetic toward minorities as 
much as he was an assimilationist, eager for everyone to conform 
to his Anglophilic ideal. Likewise, Frankfurter at times seemed 
indifferent, even hostile, toward his own Jewish descent, marrying 
a non-Jewish woman and regarding his Judaism as a mere 
“accident of birth” (p. 152), but he was, at least at one point, 
Presser notes, an ardent Zionist, lobbying for the Balfour 
Declaration and participating in the founding conference of 
the American Jewish Congress. 
Presser suggests that Frankfurter has a mixed legacy with 
modern-day scholars because he was himself conflicted. Indeed, 
it seems that Frankfurter was, at heart, a Wilsonian and FDR 
Democrat, and he had difficulty adjusting to the emerging New 
Left, leading various elements of his brilliance to shine at different 
points on the ideological spectrum, not always in ways that we 
tend to find appealing in the 21st century.41 There is at least some 
coherence to be found at the conclusion of his incredibly 
successful though enigmatic life, with Frankfurter asking his 
friend, Professor Louis Henkin, an Orthodox Jew, to speak at his 
funeral—as Frankfurter explained, “I came into the world a Jew 
and although I did not live my life entirely as a Jew, I think it is 
fitting that I should leave as a Jew” (p. 152 n.494). 
Wechsler similarly contained many contradictions. Like 
Frankfurter, Wechsler was a liberal in many ways, but he assailed 
 
 40. Indeed, Frankfurter was closely involved in founding the ACLU in 1920; he 
served as a legal and policy advisor on the NAACP’s National Legal Committee in the 
decade preceding his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1939; and he hired the first 
African-American Supreme Court clerk nearly a decade later in 1948. Moreover, 
Frankfurter was indirectly responsible for Brown v. Board of Education, in recommending 
in 1930 that the NAACP commission one of his former students, Nathan Margold, to 
construct a 218-page report that mapped out a brilliant and highly successful litigation path 
toward desegregation. See STEPHEN WHITFIELD, JEWISH FATES, ALTERED STATES, IN 
JEWISH ROOTS IN SOUTHERN SOIL: A NEW HISTORY 304, 317 (Marcie Ferris et al. eds., 
2006). 
 41. A case could be made that Frankfurter was essentially a proto-neoconservative, 
given his support for a powerful centralized government, his eagerness for global 
engagement, and his racially egalitarian but assimilationist leanings. 
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the most cherished progressive principle, racial egalitarianism, 
and he did this by challenging the constitutional validity of its 
greatest triumph, Brown v. Board of Education.42 Presser devotes 
several pages to exploring why and how Wechsler advanced his 
nearly blasphemous view—in Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law,43 one of the most controversial law review 
articles of all time—that Brown was an illegitimate exercise of 
judicial review because it did not rest on neutral principles of law. 
In that article, Wechsler defined a “neutral principle” as 
consisting of two elements—content generality and equal 
applicability. Applying these criteria, Weschler argued that a 
principled decision rests on “reasons quite transcending the 
immediate result that is achieved,”44 and applies to all parties 
equally, “whether a labor union or a taxpayer, a Negro or a 
segregationist, a corporation or a Communist.”45 
In analyzing the Wechsler article, Presser may be charged 
with seeing too much conservatism in the argument. Wechsler’s 
argument, after all, was ostentatiously disinterested in stare 
decisis, federalism, originalism, and majoritarianism.46 To the 
contrary, Wechsler’s principal problem with the Brown decision 
was its lack of neutrality—specifically how, in distinguishing the 
Plessy line of cases, the Court limited its reasoning to public 
education and grounded this distinction on highly questionable 
social science. At the end of the article, Wechsler claimed that 
whereas the Brown decision could not be defended on equal-
protection grounds, it arguably could be justified through a 
freedom of association for people who desired integration. But 
that led Wechsler to wonder how a court could justify the right to 
integration in freedom-of-association principles, without also 
giving rise to the complementary right, that of segregationists not 
to associate with other races. Wechsler conceded that he “[w]ould 
 
 42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 43. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1959). 
 44. Id. at 15. 
 45. Id. at 12. 
 46. Indeed, Wechsler specifically conceded that several things that bothered other 
critics of the decision did not bother him. In particular, Wechsler explained that he was not 
bothered that Brown implicitly overruled long-settled precedent, that it required the 
transformation of social traditions prevailing in a large swath of the nation, that it was 
ostensibly at odds with the original meaning of the 14th Amendment, that it was contrary 
to popular will, and that it may have been premature in preempting congressional action. 
Id. at 31–32. 
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like to think there is [only the right to integrative association], but 
I confess that I have not yet written the opinion”47 demonstrating 
how preferring the integrationist’s over the segregationist’s 
freedom of association would be a neutral principle. Writing such 
an opinion, Wechsler concluded, is the “challenge of the school-
segregation cases.” 48 
Presser may have overstated Wechsler’s conservatism in 
overlooking the extent to which Wechsler engaged here in the 
very type of reasoning that he was condemning – the crafting and 
tailoring of doctrines with an eye constantly averted toward 
particular policy outcomes. As later scholars would point out, 
Wechsler’s neutral principles project was doomed from the start, 
because it did not consider requiring courts to derive such neutral 
principles through neutral interpretive methodologies.49 This 
realization gave rise to the interpretive crises of the 1970s, which 
Presser explores in Chapter 14 by examining six leading scholars 
within the Critical Legal Studies movement (“CLS”), and in 
Chapter 15 by profiling University of Chicago Law Professor and 
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, the principal architect of 
the Law and Economics movement (“LE”). 
Both CLS and LE represent what we may characterize as a 
second infidelity to Presser’s traditional view of the nature of law. 
And just as how a second infidelity almost invariably relates to the 
first, but may be more audacious, pushing the boundary of the 
relationship to challenge the sustainability of the marriage, we see 
in both CLS and LE two brazen and radical extensions of legal 
realism. 
IV. A SECOND INFIDELITY 
On the surface, the LE and CLS movements represent 
radically divergent ideological perspectives, with LE making 
efficiency the central criterion of a legal system and CLS arguing 
that such an emphasis on efficiency promotes inter-personal 
alienation through the instantiation of structural economic 
exploitation (to use the CLS Marxist nomenclature). But in fact 
LE and CLS—both born in the 1970s, following the triumph of 
 
 47. Id. at 34. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).  
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legal realism in the academy and the Warren Court over the 
nation—share a view of law that was at one time utterly foreign 
to the American legal academy: the view that law is nothing more 
than an instrument for political power. This view, expressed most 
stridently in the CLS dictum “law is politics,” represents the total 
denunciation of the traditional view that law is the expression of 
a divine order naturally inhering in human relations. 
Thus, when Presser questions whether it could be that CLS 
and LE scholars “actually live in different legal worlds” (p. 296), 
it may be one of the few times when Presser’s prose misses the 
mark. CLS and LE occupy the exact same legal world—one where 
law is merely an instrument of power—but they occupy different 
political worlds. Whereas LE sought to impose objectivity on the 
law, it held, just as CLS, that this order did not necessarily inhere 
in nature or legal norms themselves. For LE, it was the duty of 
judges to create that order, and the LE scholars sought 
economically savvy judges like Posner to perform that task. CLS 
scholars, by contrast, thought that any such efforts to impose 
objectivity and order would fail, and, moreover, would inevitably 
result in class, gender, and racial exploitation and alienation. The 
Crits therefore sought judges who would reject all pretensions of 
legal objectivity and consistency, in an effort to overcome and 
eradicate the surface-level distinctions responsible for inter-
subjective alienation. 
Essentially, then, LE and CLS scholars disagreed simply on 
how to achieve a well-ordered society. Their disputes over 
economic models and human alienation were, at bottom, political 
and indeed moral disagreements. This, of course, is what has 
generated the truism, “We are all legal realists now”—which in 
fact has become such a truism that it is difficult to attribute the 
quote to a single source,50 leading Michael Steven Green to make 
the meta-observation that it “has become a cliché to call it a 
‘cliché.’”51 Whether law is politics, or law is economics, both CLS 
and LE represent the same legal world: a world where law is not 
law. 
 
 50. Presser is one of the few scholars to cite a source, (p. 134 n.433), tracing it to 
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988). To my 
knowledge, this is the first time the phrase was used. 
 51. Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1915, 1917 (2005). 
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It is worth noting here that Presser chose to cover Ronald 
Dworkin in Chapter 12, immediately after the Wechsler chapter, 
apparently under the reasoning that this placement was ideally 
suited to demonstrate how Dworkin used his “law as moral 
principle” approach to combat Wechsler’s “neutral principles” 
assault on the Warren Court legacy. But it may have made more 
sense for Presser to discuss Dworkin after the CLS and LE 
chapters, in addition to after the chapters on the related critical 
scholars Catharine MacKinnon (Chapter 17) and Patricia 
Williams (Chapter 21), given that so much of Dworkin’s work 
sought to defuse the CLS attack on the objectivity of legal 
thought, while still legitimizing many of its policy goals. Indeed, 
the astute reader will notice how Chapter 16 (on Bruce Ackerman 
and Akhil Amar) works in consonance with Chapter 12 (on 
Dworkin) to illustrate how these post-Crit thinkers developed 
highly sophisticated and arguably formalistic theories of law, in an 
effort to rise above the nihilism of CLS, while still, coincidentally, 
defending legal positions that match up almost perfectly with the 
political goals of CLS, and moreover, entirely with the 
Democratic Party’s agenda over the last 50 years.52 
The back-and-forth in these late chapters creates a dizzying 
effect, which plays into Presser’s wonderful and meandering way 
of unfolding his narrative, but perhaps at the price of telling a 
more coherent and linear story, whereby the Crits responded to 
the supposed neutrality of the Wechsler “process school” by 
extending and radicalizing realism in a way that was later justified 
and legitimated by progressively minded scholars like Ackerman 
and Dworkin. 
Presser astutely notes how although CLS may be dead (in the 
sense that very few legal scholars still write with the radical tone 
and esoteric style as people like Kennedy, Gabel, and Unger did 
 
 52. One might even sense from these chapters the implication that Dworkin and 
Ackerman did more to distance a traditionalist like Presser from American legal discourse 
than CLS did or ever could have, because while critical scholars sought a candid and 
transparent exploration of power relations in American law and politics, Dworkin and 
Ackerman sought to justify transformations of power, such as the expansion of federal 
authority in the New Deal or the rights revolution of the Warren Court, under cryptic 
appeals to underlying moral principles and popular sovereignty. That is not to take 
anything away from either Dworkin’s or Ackerman’s account of law—to the contrary, both 
projects are highly interesting and compelling. But if one looks at them ideologically, in 
terms of how they serviced the progressive cause of making legal discourse more 
egalitarian, Dworkin and Ackerman may have done more than CLS to render any 
challenge to progressive politics outside the legal mainstream. 
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in the 1970s and 80s), CLS politics are very much still alive. As a 
primary example of this, Presser points to the Obama Presidency, 
arguing in the chapter on CLS, and alluded to again in the chapter 
on the President himself, that Obama represents “the unfolding 
of some of the ideas promoted by critical legal studies”—
particularly how “legal actors can reshape the institutions of the 
market economy and even of democracy itself” (p. 295). Presser 
could have made an even more radical claim here, one that does 
not so unfairly single out President Obama as bearing particular 
responsibility for pushing this agenda. 
That radical claim is this: The bulk of the legal academy, not 
just a few radical outliers, can be characterized as responsible for 
carrying the CLS torch, at least in terms of policy goals and 
ideological orientation. If you consider, for example, the Merrick 
Garland-inspired wish lists recently issued by Crits like Tushnet53 
and progressive non-Crits like Chemerinsky,54 as they 
contemplated what the Supreme Court’s agenda might be like 
under a Hillary Clinton presidency, their visions were almost 
identical: Both involved the full deployment of federal resources 
to pursue race-conscious and wealth-redistributive policies in an 
effort to secure a truly egalitarian society. 
Understood in this light, CLS was not necessarily that radical 
in its politics, but rather in its theory of what law is and how we 
should talk about it. Put differently, once the hard part of 
transforming power relations within the legal academy and the 
broader legal culture was complete, so that nearly every law 
school in the country became associated with various progressive 
causes, CLS, as a deconstructive theory of power in law, had little 
to offer the legal left, which after this power transition was faced 
with the different task of legitimating and justifying its newfound 
power on more permanent grounds. This project was pursued 
under more formalistic theories, such as Dworkin’s underlying 
principles, Ackerman’s constitutional moments, and Amar’s 
common-law constitutionalism. 
 
 53. Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism,
BALKANIZATION (May 6, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defen
sive-crouch-liberal.html. 
 54. Erwin Chemerinsky, What If the Supreme Court Were Liberal?, THE ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/what-if-the-supreme-
court-were-liberal/477018. 
5 - MERRIAM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/18 11:59 AM 
94 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:71 
 
That raises a related point that would have been interesting 
for Presser to pursue here: If we understand CLS as a theory of 
power relations in law, as opposed to a specific set of desired 
policy outcomes, what makes it necessarily a left-wing 
movement? The Crits, themselves, to be sure, were all leftists, 
seeking to use critical theory for the thoroughly egalitarian 
purpose of deconstructing the various class, race, and gender 
hierarchies structuring the American legal system. But their 
theory of law need not be deployed for such ends. Indeed, CLS is 
in many ways the Anglo-American adaptation of a philosophy of 
law that first appeared, and is still much more common in, 
Continental Europe, where it is not thought of as inherently 
progressive—in fact, it is most often associated with the right-wing 
German theorist, Carl Schmitt. 
Three distinct but related patterns underlying the 
transformation of American legal, political, and social power may 
make critical legal theory a particularly good fit for how 
conservatives think about legal texts and judicial authority in 21st 
century America. Law Professors suggests but does not explicate 
these points. I will briefly do so here, for the purpose of 
highlighting what I believe to be a critical theme underlying the 
book.   
One, there are few—and decreasingly few—voices in the 
academy and judiciary representing a traditionally conservative 
view of law. Presser notes in various places how much the legal 
academy has changed demographically and ideologically over the 
last seventy-five years—going from overwhelmingly Christian, 
and, at least in some sense, socially conservative, to 
disproportionately Jewish and radically progressive (p. 153 n.495, 
p. 320, p. 348).55 On this point, Presser cites a study finding that 82 
 
 55. The ethnic component of this transformation is largely due to the fact that, well 
into the 1950s, there were rigid quotas on the number of Jewish students and professors at 
elite universities. For a fascinating historical account of the Jewish experience in Ivy 
League universities, particularly at Yale, see DAN A. OREN, JOINING THE CLUB: A 
HISTORY OF JEWS AND YALE (1986). See also Stephen Steinberg, How Jewish Quotas 
Began, COMMENTARY (Sept. 1, 1971), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/
articles/how-jewish-quotas-began. The transformation of the American legal academy 
after the Jewish quota was lifted is perhaps represented most strikingly in that Frankfurter 
was the only full-time Jewish faculty member at Harvard Law School until at least 1929. 
But just 41 years later, after the quotas had been lifted, Robert Burt observed how, despite 
representing only two percent of the overall population, Jews represented 25 percent of all 
American law school professors and 38 percent of “elite” American law school professors 
(p. 153 n.495). For a more comprehensive study of gender, ethnic, and political diversity in 
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percent of law professors identity as Democrat voters (p. 320), but 
as striking as that number is, he could have pushed this point much 
further. The percentage is actually much higher if the few right-
leaning and Christian schools are excluded from the calculation. 
And the percentage is even higher than that at the most elite law 
schools, demonstrated in Nick Rosencranz’s recent observation 
that 98 percent of the Georgetown Law faculty can be fairly 
characterized as left-wing, with one of the three right-of-center 
faculty members being the socially progressive libertarian Randy 
Barnett.56 
Two, as a result of there being almost no traditionalists left in 
the academy, the few scholars endorsing natural law or 
originalism are overwhelmingly socially progressive, more often 
identifying as libertarian than conservative.57 There are precious 
few scholars practicing Bork’s brand of originalism, structured by 
a traditional cultural framework. Presser generally ignores this 
distinction between libertarians and traditional conservatives,58 
which is a shame, because it is an increasingly significant 
distinction in conservative legal thought, particularly as the 
distinction relates to theories of originalism, natural law, and 
judicial review.59 
 
the legal academy, underscoring the unrepresentativeness of its demography and ideology, 
see James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013, 39 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 89, 118 (2016) (“By ratios, the most overrepresented group is white male 
Jewish Democrats. They are overrepresented by a ratio of nearly 28 to 1.”). 
 56. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Intellectual Diversity in the Legal Academy, 37 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 137 (2014) (“We are a faculty of 120, and, to my knowledge, 
the number of professors who are openly conservative, or libertarian, or Republican or, in 
any sense, to the right of the American center, is three—three out of 120. There are more 
conservatives on the nine-member United States Supreme Court than there are on this 
120-member faculty. Moreover, the ideological median of the other 117 seems to lie not 
just left of center, but closer to the left edge of the Democratic Party. Many are further left 
than that.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 57. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2013). On the growing convergence between mainstream 
(i.e., progressive) constitutionalism and libertarian constitutionalism, see David E. 
Bernstein & Ilya Somin, The Mainstreaming of Libertarian Constitutionalism, 77 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (2015). 
 58. Presser explores libertarianism only obliquely—through Posner’s work in law 
and economics, and Sunstein’s (ostensibly oxymoronic) “libertarian paternalism” (ch. 22). 
 59. For that reason, it is regrettable that Presser’s only discussion of right-of-center 
libertarianism is through Posner’s pragmatic and decidedly non-natural law contributions 
to the LE movement.  Had Presser included Randy Barnett among the profiled law 
professors, it would have given Presser an opportunity to explore the increasingly fractured 
coalition between traditionalists and libertarians, both within law and the larger 
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Three, because most originalist scholars now are not 
traditionalists, a “New Originalism” has emerged, opening up a 
path for libertarian-oriented scholars to make socially progressive 
arguments, such as for open borders60 and same-sex marriage.61 
But just as Presser overlooks the increasingly important 
distinction within the legal right between traditionalists and 
libertarians, Presser treats originalism as a monolithic theory, 
overlooking the many variations that have arisen in originalism 
scholarship over the last decade—almost all of which point 
toward the left-end of the ideological spectrum. 
Thus, given these three transformations within the legal 
academy relating to tradition, natural law, and originalism, 
Presser’s CLS analysis would have benefitted from a more 
creative and forward-looking exploration of whether a critical 
approach to law may eventually become more aligned with the 
legal right than the legal left. To be clear, that is not to suggest the 
possibility of conservatives becoming full-fledged Crits who see 
law, in its essence, as nothing more than power. There is obviously 
something about conservatism that ultimately requires seeing the 
“permanence” in things, as Russell Kirk so eloquently put it.62 But 
if conservatives now truly see the “irremediable corruption of our 
legal culture,”63 as Justice Alito recently alleged in his Obergefell 
dissent, conservatives may very well conclude that conventional 
 
conservative movement. The traditionalist-libertarian fracture on natural law is largely 
traceable to Robert Bork’s objection to natural law as a guide for judicial decisionmaking.  
 60. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Immigration and the US Constitution, OPEN 
BORDERS (Mar. 18, 2013), https://openborders.info/blog/immigration-and-the-us-
constitution. 
 61. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016); Michael Ramsey, Is There an Originalist Case 
for Same-Sex Marriage?, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 25, 2013), http://originalismblog.
typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2013/03/is-there-an-originalist-case-for-same-sex-marr
iagemichael-ramsey.html; Ilya Somin, Originalism Is Broad Enough To Include Arguments 
for a Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/28/originalism-is-
broad-enough-to-include-arguments-for-a-constitutional-right-to-same-sex-marriage/?
tid=a_inl&utm_term=.39a1adc906fc. 
 62. RUSSELL KIRK, What Is Conservatism?, in THE ESSENTIAL RUSSELL KIRK: 
SELECTED ESSAYS (George Panichas ed., 2014) (“The Permanence of a state, roughly 
speaking, is its conservative interest . . . .”).  
 63. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2643 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). On the 
significance of Justice Alito’s reference to the “irremediable corruption of our legal 
culture,” particularly in signifying the failures of constitutional conservatism, see Nelson 
Lund’s excellent essay. Nelson Lund, The Corruption of Constitutional Conservatism, 
CLAREMONT REVIEW OF BOOKS (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.claremont.org/crb/basic
page/the-corruption-of-constitutional-conservatism. 
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modes of conservative legal reasoning, such as formalism and 
originalism, will serve only to reinforce the liberal cultural and 
legal hegemony. 
Presser comes the closest to addressing how a critical 
approach to law can provide insight into this transformation of 
power when Presser argues that CLS can best explain why 
President Obama, along with Attorney General Eric Holder, felt 
justified in using the authority of the Department of Justice to 
weigh in on the Ferguson controversy (in favor of the black victim 
and against the white police officer) before the facts involving the 
shooting had been resolved (p. 290 n.877). Presser also could have 
mentioned here other examples of the Obama Administration 
interpreting the law and legal events through the subjective, 
thereby weakening the notion that objectivity and certainty 
inhere in legal norms.64 If Presser is right in characterizing the 
Obama Administration as a CLS presidency, it would suggest 
that, in the forty years since the height of the CLS movement in 
the 1970s, the power dynamics of the nation have undergone such 
an enormous shift that CLS values, particularly as applied to 
matters like racial justice and sexual identity, have become part of 
the very power structure the Crits assailed. 
If CLS values are indeed forming a new power structure, and 
that is certainly a plausible proposition in light of the 
transformations of the legal academy covered in Presser’s book,65 
 
 64. For example, after being charged that his “Justice Department went easy in a 
voting rights case against members of the New Black Panther Party because they are 
African American,” Attorney General Holder dismissed the charge on the ground that 
any threat to the voting rights of non-blacks was not comparable to the disenfranchisement 
of “my people.” Josh Gerstein, Eric Holder: Black Panther Case Focus Demeans “My 
People,” POLITICO (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2011/03/
eric-holder-black-panther-case-focus-demeans-my-people-033839. Similarly, after 
Trayvon Martin’s tragic death, President Obama claimed that “it is absolutely imperative 
that we investigate every aspect of this, and that everybody pulls together—federal, state 
and local—to figure out exactly how this tragedy happened.” Obama severed the link 
betweeen legal norms and the subjective by exhorting the nation to legal action while 
contemplating that “[i]f I had a son, he’d look like Trayvon.” Krissah Thompson & Scott 
Wilson, Obama on Trayvon Martin: “If I Had a Son, He’d Look Like Trayvon,” WASH. 
POST (Mar. 23, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-if-i-had-a-son-hed-
look-like-trayvon/2012/03/23/gIQApKPpVS_story.html?utm_term=.d28004f93d00. 
 65. A fascinating parallel can be found in the positions of civil liberties organizations 
like the ACLU—which was founded in 1920 to protect political dissidents and civil liberties 
from majoritarian authority, but now often works in tandem with government to penalize 
dissidents who violate non-discrimination norms. See, for example, the ACLU’s 
participation with Washington State in a lawsuit against a florist who, for religious reasons, 
refused to create a floral arrangement for a same-sex wedding. See Kirk Johnson, Florist 
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that power transformation may eventually change the way that 
legal concepts like formalism and originalism relate to the 
ideological spectrum.66 This is a particularly timely point in light 
of the 2016 populist revolt and the attendant judicial resistance 
against President Trump’s immigration agenda. Presser cannot 
be faulted for completing his book before the ideological shake-
up wrought by the 2016 election. But long before that election 
there were signs of the dissolution of National Review-style 
conservatism.67 And Presser’s analysis would have been more 
provocative, timely, and compelling had it strayed more from 
conventional partisan talking points and considered what this 
dissolution might augur for our undersatndings of the legal 
academy, CLS, and the legal right. 
Similarly, just as Presser’s analysis would have benefited 
from probing the relationship between CLS and the legal left, it 
likewise would have benefited from questioning what makes LE 
a right-wing school of thought, as it is often represented. Indeed, 
Presser notes how Posner, before he was so critical of originalism 
and various social conservative causes, was “a darling of the 
right,” thereby earning a federal judicial nomination from 
President Reagan in 1981 (p. 303). But Presser does not explore 
why Posner was, and to some extent still is, considered 
conservative. This is especially curious given Presser’s affiliation 
with paleoconservatism, which has been characterized by just as 
much skepticism toward big business and the fetishization of 
capital, as skepticism toward capital’s confiscation and 
redistribution. For paleocons, unlimited global capitalism and 
statist centralization are equally problematic because they can be 
equally destructive of community and family life. 
 
Discriminated Against Gay Couple, Washington State Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/us/florist-discrimination-gay-
couple-washington-court.html. 
 66. Indeed, some recent trends in American law and culture have led legal scholars 
to observe a growing left-wing patriotism and interest in originalism. For a fascinating 
argument on this point, linking an emerging “liberal originalism” with the racial and 
cultural dynamics of the Broadway hit Hamilton, see Richard Primus, Will Lin-
Manuel Miranda Transform the Supreme Court?, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2016), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/lin-manuel-miranda-and-the-future-of-
originalism/485651. 
 67. On the decreasing currency of National Review-style conservatism among the 
American electorate, see GEORGE HAWLEY, RIGHT-WING CRITICS OF AMERICAN 
CONSERVATISM (2016). 
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The crux of why paleoconservatives like Presser have so little 
in common with libertarians of Posner’s (or Barnett’s) ilk is that 
such libertarians make choice the ultimate touchstone of human 
freedom, without apparently considering that choice in a world 
untethered to and deracinated from social connection and cultural 
meaning will have little relationship to what many human beings 
want out of that freedom. For this reason, at least some concern 
for a nation’s tradition and cultural heritage is critical to a legal 
version of paleoconservatism, a concern that libertarians like 
Posner often times seem to lack. In fact, when framed in this light, 
the Crits and paleocons have much more in common with each 
other than either does with LE or libertarianism, at least in terms 
of the importance to human happiness of living a spiritually 
fulfilling and meaningful life. Although a Crit like Tushnet and a 
paleocon like Presser would agree on very little in designing a 
blueprint for constructing that meaning, they at least would have 
a lot to discuss in terms of making the law fulfill this need, a 
conversation in which many LE and libertarian scholars would 
have little interest in participating. 
And while the Crits and paleocons would agree on very little, 
they would certainly agree on some things, and moreover, these 
would almost certainly be things on which they would sharply 
disagree with LE types. This is evident, for example, in Presser’s 
sympathetic treatment of Catherine MacKinnon’s argument that 
pornography is a social evil that must be regulated, a view that 
LE scholars generally reject because it undermines individual 
choice—no matter how much that choice undermines a life with 
meaning, for both men and women alike, pornographic actors as 
well as viewers.  
Probing such ideological mash-ups would have enriched 
Presser’s love letter, just as reflecting on past romances and 
connections can yield new realizations about one’s current 
relationship. This is a point we will return to in our final section, 
on the rocky future of the relationship between traditionalism and 
law, where we will see that perhaps the real villains for traditional 
conservatives like Presser are not necessarily the realists and 
Crits. The real villain is the culture that has prevented legal 
conservatism from conserving the cultural and moral core of the 
American legal system. 
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V. A ROCKY FUTURE 
Three of the closing chapters (Chapters 18-20) cover diverse 
members of the legal conservative movement. That movement, 
born in the early 1980s with the creation of the Federalist Society, 
sought to reverse much of the Warren Court’s legacy, while 
grounding that reversal in a distinctly conservative theory of 
law—what came to be known as originalism in the constitutional 
context and textualism in the statutory context. Chapter 18, on 
Mary Ann Glendon, is a magnificent dedication to a brilliant 
woman, one who does not get enough attention in commentary 
on the most prolific legal scholars—partly, perhaps, because her 
work has focused on family law rather than the glamour and glitz 
of constitutional law and theory.68 One of Glendon’s greatest 
contributions is Rights Talk,69 which pointed to the dark 
underbelly of rights—namely how they often serve to atomize and 
sever individuals from a life with meaning. Presser notes how 
Glendon’s interrogation of rights discourse has some resonance 
with the CLS critique of law, but “with Glendon it has a strongly 
conservative rather than a strongly progressive coloration” (p. 
364).70 Glendon, more than any of the scholars included in the 
book, understands that many of America’s problems, those that 
concern people across the ideological spectrum, are, at their core, 
cultural, and as such, are not easily susceptible to resolution by 
law professors – or indeed, by the legal system at all. 
Chapters 19 and 20 focus on two particularly controversial 
law professors—Paul Carrington and Antonin Scalia. Carrington 
is controversial for his commentary on legal education, including 
his desire to shorten law school matriculation, his questioning 
whether the Crits belong on law school faculties, and his criticism 
of affirmative action in law school admissions. In the Carrington 
chapter, one can perhaps most brightly see the arc of Presser’s 
love letter, with Carrington representing a lost era—the southern 
romantic more concerned with public virtue than academic 
prestige.71 Presser quotes extensively from Carrington’s 
 
 68. Presser hints at a more sinister explanation for the neglect of Glendon’s work – 
that she is a “conservative Christian woman” (p. 347), perhaps the most underrepresented 
demographic in the entire legal academy. See Lindgren, supra note 55, at 148. 
 69. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991). 
 70. As mentioned above, Presser’s analysis would have benefitted from exploring in 
greater depth these overlaps between critical legal theory and traditional conservatism. 
 71. In distinguishing Carrington from many of the other scholars profiled in the book, 
Presser notes how Carrington “has never had tenure at a Northeastern or Ivy League institution, 
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controversial article, Diversity!,72 to let Carrington’s striking prose 
and provocative arguments speak for themselves, bubbling over 
with verve in inveighing against the diversity enterprise that has 
picked up significant momentum in the 25 years since the article 
was published. Carrington’s iconoclastic style dovetails nicely into 
the most iconoclastic and stylistic writer ever to sit on the 
Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia, covered in Chapter 20. 
Given the overall purpose of the book—to explore and 
chronicle changes in the legal academy—Chapter 20 may be 
faulted for focusing too much on Justice Scalia and too little on 
Professor Scalia. This chapter would have benefitted from a 
deeper exploration of what kind of professor he was, both in and 
outside the classroom.73 
If there is any conceptual fault in the Scalia chapter, it is the 
one appearing in various parts of the book—Presser’s propensity 
to hew too closely to conventional partisan narratives. For 
example, Presser distinguishes Scalia from Dworkin, on the 
ground that Scalia rejected “the essentially legislative role [for 
courts] praised by Ronald Dworkin” (p. 388). This of course fits 
with how conservatives often caricature these two great minds, 
with Scalia putatively representing the hard-line Federalist 78 
view of the role of judges, and Dworkin succumbing to the sirens 
of judicial activism. But, whatever one’s take on Dworkin’s 
political leanings, it must be conceded that he argued strenuously 
that adjudication is an enterprise distinct from legislation, and he 
made this point, quite compellingly, in arguing that principle, and 
not policy, must animate judging. Conversely, Scalia can be 
charged with failing to hew the line between judging and 
legislating – given his inexplicable (and perhaps indefensible) 
acceptance of non-originalist precedent only some of the time 
(which is something Presser notes only in passing).74 
 
or one on the West Coast,” (p. 367).  Nevertheless, as dean of one of the most prestigious law 
schools south of the Mason-Dixon line (Duke Law School), Carrington was well situated within 
the legal hierarchy. 
 72. Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, UTAH L. REV. 1105 (1992). 
 73. Scalia was a law professor at the University of Virginia School of Law from 1967 to 
1971, and at the University of Chicago Law School from 1977 to 1982.  It would have been 
interesting for Presser to explore Scalia’s professorial contributions to the primary legal 
conservative organization (as the first faculty adviser to the Federalist Society) and the 
conservative movement’s primary legal theory (originalism). 
 74. Justice Scalia never resolved this issue. Shortly after he was appointed to the 
Court, he defended his derogation from originalism based on his being a “faint-hearted 
originalist,” Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989), 
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Moreover, after having documented all the changes in the 
law over the last 225 years, Presser’s analysis might have 
benefitted from considering whether Dworkin and Scalia, though 
occupying radically different perspectives in our 21st century 
ideological spectrum, have much more in common with each 
other than they do with the real targets of Presser’s affection, 
Wilson and Story. Indeed, seeing the legal academy through 
Presser’s chronology illustrates how much of our modern-day 
fighting—such as the disagreement between Scalia and Dworkin 
featured in the classic, A Matter of Interpretation75—centers on 
narrow interpretive questions arising from the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, particularly as that problem relates to the 
Warren Court legacy. This has led several scholars to argue that 
the difference between Scalia and Dworkin is not really between 
originalism and non-originalism, or adjudication and legislation, 
or even rules and principles.  The difference is rather of a much 
narrower variety—between what some have dubbed Scalia’s 
“expectation originalism,” whereby the expected applications of 
the constitutional drafters bind later interpretations, and 
Dworkin’s “semantic originalism,” whereby the purposes driving 
the creation of the text are what bind later interpretations.76 
Dworkin’s semantic originalism has given rise to Jack Balkin’s 
“living originalism,” which similarly uses original purposes and 
principles to achieve progressive goals,77 leading some to quip 
that, if originalism is this inclusive, so as to encompass a whole 
range of historical modes of interpretation, we are all originalists 
now.78 Depending on how one views the original purpose of 
originalism, the emergence of this inclusive originalism might 
signal the triumph, or death-knell, of this theory of constitutional 
interpretation. 
Whatever one’s take on originalism as a theory of 
interpretation, however, the reader will likely get the impression 
 
but he later repudiated this argument. See Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin 
Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10. 
 75.  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997). 
 76. On Dworkin’s semantic originalism, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Dworkin as 
Originalist, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 49 (2000); Larry Alexander, Was Dworkin an 
Originalist, in THE LEGACY OF RONALD DWORKIN (Wilfrid J. Waluchow & Stefan 
Sciaraffa eds., 2016). 
 77. JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2014). 
 78. James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 433, 437 (2013); see also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2349 (2015). 
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from Chapters 18-20 that the arc of the legal conservative 
movement was short-lived, having failed to achieve its goals, a 
point concretized in the fact that the final three scholars profiled 
are Patricia Williams (Chapter 21, representing critical race 
studies, alluded to above), Cass Sunstein (Chapter 22, on 
“libertarian paternalism”), and President Barack Obama 
(Chapter 23, in many ways the apotheosis of the progressive 
professor-politician, also discussed above). That this trio of 
thinkers represents the foreseeable future of the legal academy is 
made all the more solemn by Justice Scalia’s death in February 
2016, shortly before Presser completed the book. Indeed, 
although the three contemporary conservatives profiled in the 
book – Carrington, Glendon, and Scalia – undeniably provided 
outstanding contributions to how we think about the law, it must 
be conceded that, in terms of actual outcomes, they managed to 
produce very little practical change with regard to their particular 
causes. 
For example, Presser spends significant attention on how 
provocative Carrington’s charges against affirmative action were, 
but Presser elides over the fact that the criticism, as biting as it 
may have been in law school faculty lounges, turned out to be 
largely ineffectual in practice. Indeed, 25 years after the 
publication of Diversity!, the constitutionality of affirmative-
action law is now firmly settled into the Court’s precedents, with 
several Republican-appointed Justices accepting diversity as a 
compelling state interest.79 Not only does it seem extraordinarily 
unlikely that this controversial issue is going to go away anytime 
soon, certainly not by the conclusion of the 25-year window hoped 
for by Justice O’Connor in her Grutter opinion,80 but in the time 
since Carrington’s publication, racial grievances have only 
intensified, evidenced by the growing movement for reparations, 
a movement that has accelerated and spread far beyond what 
even the Crits were willing to seek openly in the 1970s.81 
 
 79. See Fisher v. University of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003). 
 80. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first 
approved the use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of 
public higher education. . . . We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”). 
 81. Ta Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 24, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/projects/reparations. Cultural, legal, and economic 
reparations to African Americans is one of the primary demands of Black Lives Matter. 
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Likewise, 30 years after Glendon’s searing indictment of 
American family law, in Abortion and Divorce in Western Law,82 
the American family is struggling more than ever, as the national 
out-of-wedlock birthrate has skyrocketed to over 40 percent, with 
the rate for African-American mothers approaching an incredible 
75 percent.83 Moreover, abortion remains a constitutionally 
protected right, due in part to a plurality of Reagan- and Bush I-
appointed Justices (Kennedy, Souter, and O’Connor) affirming in 
Casey the “essential holding” of Roe through the “undue burden” 
standard (a result in which Justices Blackman and Stevens, two 
more Republican-appointed Justices, concurred on the ground 
that they preferred the stronger Roe trimester framework).84 As 
much as the Republican Party may complain about abortion and 
single motherhood, it must be acknowledged that it has done 
incredibly little, in terms of judicial appointments and public 
policy, in furthering Glendon’s arguments about the sanctity of 
life and family. 
Finally, it is hard to find any issue central to Justice Scalia’s 
agenda that will have a lasting effect on American law in terms of 
outcomes. Even originalism, which may be Scalia’s greatest 
contribution, is unlikely to have much of a lasting impact, at least 
in terms of conserving American traditions and culture, given that 
most contemporary originalists now subscribe to “New 
Originalism,” a more theoretical and open-ended form of 
interpretation that has been used principally to pursue a 
libertarian rather than conservative agenda.85 
 
See Reparations, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://policy.m4bl.org/reparations. Even some 
conservative commentators are starting to consider reparations, though perhaps as part of 
a bargain for eliminating affirmative action. See Ross Douthat, A Different Bargain on 
Race, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/opinion/sunday/a-
different-bargain-on-race.html. 
 82. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987). 
 83. Roger Clegg, Latest Statistics on Out of Wedlock Births, THE CORNER (Oct. 
11, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/360990/latest-statistics-out-wedlock-
births-roger-clegg. 
 84. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 85. In fact, of the nine Justices appointed by Republican presidents since the formal 
birth of originalism in Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 
60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980), only two (Scalia and Thomas) have made originalism their 
principal modality of constitutional interpretation. Moreover, many scholars have 
questioned whether even these two Justices should count as true originalists.  See, e.g., 
SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE 
THOMAS (2002) (arguing that Justice Thomas interprets the Constitution against the 
libertarian background of the natural-law guarantees expressed in the Declaration of 
Independence); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” 
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That is not to deny categorically Steven Calabresi’s 
statement, quoted by Presser, that Scalia was “the most important 
justice in American history—greater than former Chief Justice 
John Marshall himself” (p. 403). In terms of style, character, and 
charm, Scalia’s greatness is undeniable. And in terms of legal 
wisdom and methodology, his greatness is certainly arguable, 
depending of course on one’s ideological orientation and 
preferred mode of legal interpretation.86 Indeed, for a 
traditionalist like Presser, Scalia was the model Justice, as “the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first century’s greatest judicial 
traditionalist, and perhaps its greatest champion of the rule of 
law” (p. 403). But in terms of persuasive efficacy, especially in 
producing traditionalist outcomes, Scalia’s importance is often 
overstated. Notwithstanding his abundant brilliance, he could not 
manage to keep the boulder on top of the mountain, when the 
entire legal culture was driving and impelling it downwards. At 
least one can hope that, to borrow Camus’ analysis of Sisyphus, 
Scalia was happy in pursuing his endeavor, no matter how futile it 
may have been.87 
CONCLUSION 
The concluding chapter of Law Professors leaves the reader 
with Presser’s not unexpectedly pessimistic ruminations on the 
status of the American legal academy and law in general: “Lady 
Justice may no longer be wearing her blindfold” (p. 460), which 
for Presser constitutes a serious threat to the rule of law. The 
critical reader might resist Presser’s diagnosis here, however, on 
the ground that Lady Justice was never blindfolded—and perhaps 
for good reason: As President Obama famously described the 
arbitration of justice, it is messy and gritty, requiring an eye 
 
Originalism, 75 CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006) (arguing that Justice Scalia is not truly an originalist, 
given his “faint-hearted” derogations from original meaning). 
 86. For an example of one argument against Scalia’s wisdom, see Gary Peller’s 
vituperative response to Dean Traynor’s press release mourning Scalia’s death on behalf 
of the Georgetown Law community—in particular, Peller objected on the ground that 
Scalia “was a defender of privilege, oppression and bigotry, one whose intellectual 
positions were not brilliant but simplistic and formalistic.” David Lat, Controversy Erupts 
at a T14 Law School Over How (Or Even Whether) To Mourn Justice Scalia, 
ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 17, 2016), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/02/controversy-erupts-at-
a-t14-law-school-over-how-or-even-whether-to-mourn-justice-scalia/2. 
 87. ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS: AND OTHER ESSAYS 123 (First 
Vintage International ed., 1991) (1955) (“The struggle itself toward the heights is enough 
to fill a man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”). 
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constantly on the scales to ensure that the law lives up to its 
highest purposes. 
Most readers of Law Professors likely will not conclude the 
book in absolute agreement with Presser’s diagnosis that the rule 
of law in America is actually on the verge of being destroyed by 
law professors and their judicial accomplices. Partisanship has, to 
be sure, invaded the legal academy and judiciary in a way that was 
previously unheard of, and legal scholarship and judicial 
craftsmanship have certainly changed over time. But overall, the 
rule of law, that fuzzy contestable concept that at its core simply 
requires a sovereign to follow legal texts and comply with legal 
authorities,88 is not categorically different now than it was one or 
even two hundred years ago. As much as we might complain that 
our current president, just like his predecessor, neglects legal 
commands,89 both of these supposed authoritarians90 have 
followed judicial decisions and legal processes, no matter how 
much they have griped about it.91 
So is Presser simply a Cassandra, needlessly worrying about 
a legal system that is as healthy as ever? Not at all. Something has 
indeed been lost, something precious. And it is increasingly hard 
to imagine that thing being recovered. In reading Law Professors, 
particularly the conclusion, one may hear traces of one of Justice 
Scalia’s great quotes (in dissent of course): “The Court must be 
living in another world,” Scalia wrote. “Day by day, case by case, 
it is busy designing a Constitution for a country I do not 
 
 88. See generally BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW (2004). On the 
contestability of the rule of law, see Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially 
Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137 (2002). 
 89. Presser discusses Obama’s many derogations from the law (pp. 443–54). For a 
more extensive discussion, suggesting that Obama’s disregard for legal constraints verged 
on authoritarianism, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION’S UNPRECEDENTED ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE 
OF LAW (2015); see also JOSH BLACKMAN, UNRAVELED: OBAMACARE, RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY, AND EXECUTIVE POWER (2016). 
 90. Indeed, it is quite astonishing how frequently commentators refer to both of these 
presidents as authoritarian. See, e.g., David French, Despite the Hysteria, Trump Is 
Trending Less Authoritarian Than Obama, NATIONAL REVIEW (Feb. 23, 2017), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445185/trump-less-authoritarian-obama. 
 91. For example, after complaining of the “travel ban” decision by the “so-called judge,” 
President Trump did not ignore the ruling. Instead, Trump issued a narrower executive order, 
designed to comply with the decision. That second executive order was subsequently invalidated 
by multiple federal courts, prompting President Trump to issue a third executive order to comply 
with those rulings. That third executive order has also been invalidated by lower courts and it is 
currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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recognize.”92 What is unrecognizable to a traditionalist like 
Presser is not so much the machinery of the rule of law or the 
missing blindfold on Lady Justice, but the identity of the nation 
itself. 
That is what has been lost: that shared sense of meaning and 
understanding, anchored in tradition and belonging. Professor 
Presser’s powerful account of the legal academy demonstrates 
how, over the last 225 years, that identity has been slipping away. 
In 21st century America, there is certainly the rule of law, and it is 
perhaps as strong and healthy ever, but it is operating in a 
markedly different way, running a system where diversity, change, 
and individualism are more integral to the legal order than 
commonality, stability, and community. 
The book thus leaves the reader with the indelible impression 
that what really matters in the 21st century is not so much that 
we’re all realists or all originalists. What matters is that we’re all 
multicultural progressives now. For a traditionalist, this does not 
necessarily mean that American law cannot survive, or even that 
we cannot practice or teach law within this system. Perhaps we 
can even learn to love it. But it also may be the case that we can 
really only fall in love once, for no person or thing can replace, as 
Kierkegaard wrote, “my heart’s sovereign mistress (‘Regina’) 
stored in the deepest recesses of my heart, in my most brimmingly 
vital thoughts, there where it is equally far to heaven as to hell–
unknown divinity.” 93 
 
 
 92. Board of Comm’rs, Waubansee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 93. See KIERKEGAARD, supra note 3, at 100. 
